U. S. Supreme Court and Federal Criminal Defense Cases for July 25-29 and Other News

U. S. Supreme Court and Federal Criminal Defense Cases for July 25-29 and Other News United States Supreme Court Happenings – July 25-29, 2016 The Court is now in its summer recess. Its next Confer…

Source: U. S. Supreme Court and Federal Criminal Defense Cases for July 25-29 and Other News

United States Supreme Court and Federal Criminal Defense Cases for July 18-22, 2016

United States Supreme Court and Federal Criminal Defense Cases for July 18-22, 2016

United States Supreme Court Happenings – July 18-22, 2016

The Court is now in its summer recess. Its next Conference is scheduled for Monday, September 26, 2016.

Favorable Federal Circuit Cases from July18-22, 2016

2nd Circuit
United States v. Jones, (No. 15-1518-cr)(2nd Cir. July 21, 2016)– Jones appeals from a sentence entered in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Garaufis, J.) following a jury trial convicting him of assaulting a federal officer in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111.  He was sentenced as a career offender principally to 180 months in prison to be followed by three years of supervised release. He argued on appeal that, in light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010), New York robbery is no longer necessarily a “crime of violence” within the meaning of U.S.S.G. §§ 4B1.1(a) and 4B1.2(a) and that the district court therefore erred in concluding that his prior conviction for first-degree robbery could automatically serve as one of the predicate offenses for a career offender designation. He also argued that his sentence is substantively unreasonable.  The Court concluded that, after Johnson, a conviction for first-degree robbery in New York is not in every instance a conviction for a “crime of violence” and therefore the Court vacated his sentence and remanded for resentencing.

5th Circuit
United States v. Sanchez-Rodriguez, (No. 15-41056)(5th Cir. July18, 2016)– Sanchez-Rodriguez was convicted in 2002 of dealing in stolen property in a Florida state court. On April 30, 2015, Sanchez-Rodriguez pleaded guilty to one count of illegal reentry in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(1). In sentencing him, the district court concluded that Sanchez-Rodriguez’s 2002 Florida conviction was an aggravated felony within the meaning of USSG § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C). However, because the relevant Florida statute applies to conduct outside the definition of the generic crime under the sentencing Guidelines, the Court could not agree that SanchezRodriguez’s conviction was an aggravated felony under USSG § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C). Accordingly, the Court vacated Sanchez-Rodriguez’s sentence and remanded for re-sentencing.

7th Circuit
United States v. Robinson, (No. 15-2019)(7th Cir. July 22, 2016)–Robinson’s guilty plea was routine; his sentencing hearing was not. Robinson pleaded guilty to two counts of traveling in interstate commerce to facilitate heroin distribution, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3). During his sentencing hearing, the district court went far afield in its comments. The Court was  left without the ability to say confidently that the sentence was imposed in accordance with the proper procedures. The Court therefore vacated Robinson’s sentence and remanded for resentencing. See United States v. Figueroa, 622 F.3d 739, 741 (7th Cir. 2010).

Montana v. Cross, (No. 14-3313)(7th Cir. July 19, 2016)– This case is an unusual circumstance in that the Seventh Circuit affirmed Montana’s conviction and sentence. However, this case is important because of one sentence in the opinion where the Seventh Circuit states that  Rosemond [v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240 (2014)] significantly changed the landscape for his offense of conviction, and therefore applies retroactively.

8th Circuit
United States  v.  West, (No.  15-3026)(8th Cir. July 22, 2016) – The district court’s evidentiary rulings did not deprive defendant of his ability to present a   mistaken-belief defense in this tax fraud prosecution; Special Conditions   #13 of defendant’s supervised release which prevents him from creating any   new websites and requires him to remove any existing websites is overly broad; Special Condition #14, which bans defendant from using or   possessing computing devices without prior written approval and subjects   him to searches of any computer he does own, is also overly broad; these two conditions are vacated and the matter was remanded for resentencing.

9th Circuit
Jones v. Harrington, (No. 13-56360)(9th Cir. July 22, 2016)– The panel reversed the district court’s judgment denying California state prisoner Jones’s habeas corpus petition challenging his murder conviction, and remanded with instructions to grant the writ, in a case in which Jones, after hours of police questioning with little progress, told the officers “I don’t want to talk no more.” The panel held that any reasonable jurist would have to conclude that when Jones said he did not want to talk “no more,” he meant it, and that by continuing to interrogate Jones after his invocation of his right to remain silent, the officers squarely violated Miranda v. Arizona. The panel wrote that the government cannot use against Jones anything he said after his invocation, and held that allowing the state to use his post-invocation statements against him, even to argue that his initial invocation was ambiguous, is contrary to clearly established Supreme Court case law.

10th Circuit
United States v. Little, (No. 15-2019)(10th Cir. July 19, 2016)– After police discovered stolen weapons in Cody Little’s residence, a jury convicted him of being a felon in possession of a firearm and of possessing a stolen firearm. Little appeals, challenging several jury instructions. The Court  held that the district court erroneously relied on the Sentencing Guidelines’ residual clause in calculating Little’s offense level. Thus, exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(2), the Court vacated his sentence and remanded for resentencing.

11th Circuit
In Re: Antrone Davis, (Nos. 16-13779-J; 16-14615-J)(11th Cir. July 21, 2016)– Davis has filed two pro se application for permission to file a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion based on Johnson. The Court held that Davis had made the “prima facie showing” required by § 2244(b)(3)© and Granted his application.
Perhaps previewing the coming work in Beckles, four (4) Eleventh Circuit judges make a case against circuit’s refusal to apply Johnson to guidelines. After the US Supreme Court ruled that a key clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act violated “the Constitution’s prohibition of vague criminal laws” in Johnson. The question arose how Johnson would impact application of the career offender guideline of the US Sentencing Guidelines.  Notably, the Justice Department has consistently conceded Johnson-based constitutional problems with that career offender guideline, which in turn has led to most circuit courts finding Johnson-based constitutional problems with sentences based on that guideline. An Eleventh Circuit panel in US v. Matchett, 802 F.3d 1185 (11th  Cir. 2015), squarely addressed this issue and ruled that Johnson and its vagueness problem just do not apply to advisory sentencing guidelines. For a variety of reasons, we expect that the Supreme Court will ultimately agree with the majority of circuits that Johnson’s holding applies to the career offender guidelines and thereby reject the Eleventh Circuit’s Matchett precedent.  What I did not expect was that a number of Eleventh Circuit judges would set forth, in essence, some amicus briefing to the Supreme Court in order to explain in detail why they think their own circuit’s work in Matchett was wrong.  In Re: Hunt and In re: Clayton, cases in which a panel felt duty-bound to reject habeas applications due to the Matchett precedent but then followed up with separate opinions by Circuit Judges Wilson and (Jill) Pryor and Rosenbaum and Martin all explaining why they think Matchett is so wrong and so troublesome as we await the Supreme Court ruling in Beckles.

COMMENT:
Lots of interest and inquiries about Amendment 794 that we posted a few days ago. We are already seeing positive results in courts. Remember, if you were not given a reduction under USSG § 3B1.2, and you believe that you should have received same, it would be a great idea to have us check out your case to see if, in our personal opinion,  you may qualify for relief. When we look at your case, we also look for anything else that may be available. It is kind of a quick overview. We know that there are others now that are asking for $1500 to $2000 to look at people’s cases and give them a written review. We do not have time to give you a written review, but again our look is free and you don’t have anything to lose. However, you must follow our protocol below. One last thing, people complain about not being able to get through on our phone lines. Thankfully, we get lots of calls daily. We have added lines to help to avoid this problem, but we are still busy because of our  positive results we often get. Stay tuned.

FOR FREE QUICK LOOKS, YOU MUST FOLLOW PROTOCOL BELOW:
Please give your contacts our Free Lookup telephone number of 256-808-9009.  Ask your people to contact me, George, and have your name, inmate number, case number and city and state of where you were sentenced ready to give to us. Anyway who has not filed their first § 2255 Motion and are still within the time limitation period, may make a Johnson claim. We also have found several ways to get back into Court on Johnson claims. However, we have to look at your case to see if you may squarely fit into one of the ways we have found. Remember, we handle all kinds of federal criminal cases and post conviction remedies. As such, when we look up a case, we look for any possible remedy available to you for relief.

GEORGE CARLTON
LEADING EDGE RESEARCH TEAM
2701 MALL DRIVE, SUITE 7-140
FLORENCE, ALABAMA 35630
Phone: 256-808-9009
Email: leadingedgedefense@gmail.com
Website: www.leadingedgeresearchteam.com

U. S. Supreme Court Happenings, Favorable Federal Circuit Cases for June 27- July 1, 2016

U. S. Supreme Court Happenings, Favorable Federal Circuit Cases for June 27- July 1, 2016.

United States Supreme Court Happenings – June 27-July 1, 2016

The Supreme Court this week finished up its work before heading out on summer vacation. Though the Justices granted review in eight new cases, none appear to involve criminal justice issues. But the order list still had a bit of sentencing intrigue by including nine (9) Certiorari Grants, Vacated and Remanded (“GVRs”) based on its Mathis ACCA ruling from last week. Though it is never surprising to see a spate of GVRs in the wake of any significant ruling about a federal sentencing statute, it is anticipated that the fall-out from Mathis will extend to many more cases because, as reported via Justice Alito’s dissent, it seems the ruling means that “in many States, no burglary conviction will count” as a possible ACCA predicate offense. That reality not only can impact many past, present and future ACCA and career offender cases, but also could also echo through the application of burglary (and even other crimes) in past career offender guideline cases. Ultimately, I would be very surprised in the impact and import of Mathis end up nearly as grand or as complicated as last Term’s Johnson ruling. But the consequential sentencing math of Mathis still may be major. For sure, stay tuned.

Favorable Federal Circuit Cases from June 27-July 1, 2016

6th Circuit

US v. Collins, No. 15-3236 (6th Cir. June 29, 2016)–A jury convicted Collins in October of one count possessing, distributing and receiving child pornography and one count possession of child pornography. Police found more than 1,500 files on his computer, and he was charged with distributing because he used peer-to-peer file sharing programs. Under federal law, a judge can sentence a defendant to up to 20 years in prison if he or she is found guilty of child porn distribution, which is exactly what the prosecutor requested.

Meanwhile, the probation department and pretrial services suggested a guideline sentence for of 21 and 27 years in federal prison. But U. S. District Court Judge Gwin handed down a five-year sentence to Collins, the minimum allowable sentence for a distribution charge. The judge said that after Collins’ trial, he polled jurors on what they thought was an appropriate sentence. The average recommendation was 14 months, Gwin said. Federal prosecutors appealed the sentence as unreasonable, but now has lost before a unanimous

Sixth Circuit panel.

On appeal, the government argued that the jury poll was an “impermissible factor[]” for the district judge to consider in crafting an appropriate sentence. The Court disagreed stating that federal law provides nearly unfettered scope as to the sources from which a district judge may draw in determining a sentence….

District courts also have the authority to “reject the Guidelines sentencing ranges based on articulated policy disagreements in a range of contexts.” United States v. Kamper, 748 F.3d 728, 741 (6th Cir. 2014). Indeed, we have suggested the plausibility of rejecting guidelines ranges in child pornography cases based on policy disagreements.When establishing the Sentencing Commission, Congress directed it to take “the community view of the gravity of the offense” into account when crafting appropriate criminal sanctions. 28 U.S.C. § 994(c)(4). As reflected in his writing on the subject, and briefly in the sentencing hearing below, the district judge reasons that the Commission fell short of this directive.Though we reiterate that juries lack “the tools necessary for the sentencing decision,” Martin, 390 F. App’x at 538, they can provide insight into the community’s view of the gravity of an offense. See Gwin, supra at 193-94; see also Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 615-16 (2002) (BREYER, J., concurring) (jurors “reflect more accurately the composition and experiences of the community as a whole” and are “better able to determine in the particular case the need for retribution”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The jury did not determine or impose defendant’s sentence. Rather, the district judge – who does possess the necessary tools for the sentencing decision – was at all times interposed between the jurors’ views of an appropriate sentence and the sentencing guidelines’ § 3553(a) factors. Considering the jury’s sentencing recommendation as part of the sentencing calculus did not conflict with the district judge’s duty or ability to properly weigh the § 3553(a) factors and independently craft an appropriate sentence.

United States v. Brown, (No. 13-1761) (6th Cir. June 27, 2016)– A jury convicted Brown of possession with intent to distribute marijuana, possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and possession of a firearm after a previous conviction of a felony offense. On appeal, Brown challenges the denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized from his residence pursuant to a search warrant. The Court concluded that the warrant was issued without probable cause and that the good-faith exception does not apply. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court’s denial of Brown’s suppression motion, vacated his convictions, and remanded for a new trial.

9th Circuit

Cuero v. Cate, (No. 12-55911)(9th Cir. June 30, 2016)– The panel reversed the district court’s judgment denying California state prisoner Michael Daniel Cuero’s 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition and remanded. The panel held that after Cuero entered a binding, judicially-approved plea agreement guaranteeing a maximum sentence of 14 years and 4 months in prison, and stood convicted, the prosecution breached the plea agreement by moving to amend the complaint to charge Cuero’s prior assault conviction as a second strike, and the Superior Court acted contrary to federal law, clearly established by the Supreme Court in Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971), when it permitted the amendment and refused to order specific performance of the original plea agreement. The panel wrote that by failing to interpret Cuero’s plea agreement consistently with California contract law, the Superior Court unreasonably applied federal law clearly established bythe Supreme Court in Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1 (1987). The panel explained that allowing Cuero to withdraw his guilty plea, exposing Cuero to the risk of trial and receiving an indeterminate sentence of 64 years to life, was no remedy. The panel remanded with instructions to issue a conditional writ requiring the state to resentence Cuero in accordance with the original plea agreement within 60 days of the issuance of the mandate.

United States v. Lemus, (No. 14-50355) (9th Cir. June 28, 2016)– Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, the panel held that a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed methamphetamine with intent to sell it, but that no reasonable factfinder could have determined beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed more than 50 grams of methamphetamine. The panel wrote that it would be a bridge too far to allow a jury to extrapolate from comparison drugs that were not from activity related to the defendant or a conspiracy in which the defendant is involved. The panel explained that a 90% level of purity would more than suffice to support the jury’s quantity determination, if adequately connected to the drugs concerning which the defendant had constructive possession, but that the government failed to include evidence connecting that purity level to the defendant. The panel remanded for resentencing pursuant to the statutory range set forth in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)©.

SRCA NOW “OFFICIALLY” DEAD IN 2016

An article entitled “Hopes Fade for Criminal Justice Reform This Year,” from Real Clear Politics serves essentially as an obituary for the effort to get significant statutory federal sentencing reform done before the end of the Obama Administration. The Sentencing and Reform Act would modestly update federal mandatory minimum sentences to make them less brutal in non-violent drug cases and allow federal judges to invoke “safety valve” exceptions to sentence less than the mandatory minimum in certain cases. Probably the most important component of the law is that it would make the Fair Sentencing Act, which lowered the mandatory minimums for crack cocaine-related crimes to those of powder cocaine, retroactive. According to my friends at Families Against Mandatory Minimums (“FAMM”) this could help somewhere around 5,800 people currently serving sentences in federal prison.

COMMENT (from Craig):

So, based on the above,  thousands of prisoners could be stuck serving outdated sentences for cocaine crimes that no longer even apply if this law is not passed. In response to frustration that the bill isn’t going anywhere there’s been a chain of blaming that weaves throughout the article, but what do you expect from a bunch of politicians. (All you can expect from a donkey is a kick!). In my personal opinion,  a series of small “smart on crime” bills would have been far superior and far more likely to become law than the mega-reform bill that was too complicated with too many controversial parts to make passage ever likely.

I will now likely use the long weekend to reflect on the current federal sentencing reform “big picture” circa mid-2016. It is truly a shame of the failure of President Obama  to bring about real Hope and Change to Federal Sentencing.

It is also our personal opinion that anyone who has a prior conviction for burglary that has enhanced his or her sentence as a crime of violence should contact us for a Free Look Up to determine if you may have action on a Mathis claim. In light of Johnson,Welch and now Mathis, it is still very possible to get the career offender or ACCA jackets off of your sentence and get you home much sooner. Of course, we have big hopes on Beckles, but that won’t be until at least the end of this year or next year. As such, there is no time for hesitation if you are serious about fighting your case. Stay tuned.

FOR FREE QUICK LOOKS, YOU MUST FOLLOW PROTOCOL BELOW:

Please give your contacts our Free Lookup telephone number of 256-808-9009.  Ask your people to contact me, George, and have your name, inmate number, case number and city and state of where you were sentenced ready to give to us. Anyway who has not filed their first § 2255 Motion and are still within the time limitation period, may make a Johnson claim. However, we also handle all kinds of federal criminal cases and post conviction remedies.

GEORGE CARLTON

LEADING EDGE RESEARCH TEAM

2701 MALL DRIVE, SUITE 7-140

FLORENCE, ALABAMA 35630

Phone: 256-808-9009

Email: leadingedgedefense@gmail.com

Website: www.leadingedgeresearchteam.com